Encrypted DNS must not be abused as an excuse for commercial entities to collect, store and share more data on their users, and we encourage companies to insert clear statements in privacy policies committing them in this regard. It is essential that network operators and DNS providers act to protect user privacy. These options, however, should not be an excuse for service operators to burden users and escape responsibility. Users should also always be able to disable encrypted DNS entirely if they wish to do so. To avoid market monopolisation, a significant risk, we urge developers and application providers that integrate encrypted DNS as a default setting to offer their users a choice of provider.
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Recognising the desirability of captive portals for network operators, we recommend collaboration among stakeholders to develop new standards that allow a user to interact securely with a network operator’s content before accessing their full service.Īctivating DoT and DoH should always be a user choice.
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Notably, captive portals – network landing pages requiring a response such as a login – are a key functionality which will no longer be viable with the roll-out of encrypted DNS, forcing network operators to choose how to respond. Network operators will have a number of choices like this to make as encrypted DNS becomes more widely adopted. We propose a number of mitigations for this issue, particularly suggesting that operators enable the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard of GeoDNS on their services.
We hope that a shift to encrypted DNS will lead to decreased reliance on network-level filtering for censorship.Ĭoncern has been raised that DoT and DoH may decrease network efficiency by causing user traffic to be routed via geographically distant servers. DoH in particular makes it extremely difficult for network operators to implement domain-specific filters or blocks, which may have a negative impact on UK government strategies for the Internet which rely on these. Whilst DoT and DoH appear to be a win for Internet users, however, they raise issues for network operators concerned with Internet security and operational efficiency. They add protection to one of the last remaining unencrypted ‘core’ technologies of the modern Internet, strengthen resistance to censorship and can be coupled with additional protections to provide full user anonymity. Each of these protocols provides a means to secure the transfer of data during Internet domain name lookup, and they prevent monitoring and abuse of user data in this process.ĭoT and DoH provide valuable new protection for users online. This paper addresses the privacy implications of two new Domain Name System (DNS) encryption protocols: DNS-over-TLS (DoT) and DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH).
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